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During the Middle Ages, the relations between science and religion are much more appropriately represented by the relations between natural philosophy and theology. Although there were recognizable sciences in the Middle Agesastronomy, optics, and statics, for examplewhich had some relationship with theology, it was natural philosophy that had the most significant connection. In order to grasp the relationship between natural philosophy and theology, it is advisable to treat each discipline independently in two phases. Thus I shall first consider natural philosophy from two aspects: the first will be about the nature of the discipline itself, followed by the second aspect which will determine the extent to which natural philosophy was affected by theology. Theology will be treated similarly. I shall first convey a sense of theology as a discipline, and then describe how it was affected by natural philosophy and, to a lesser extent, logic, that is, how theology  was affected by the two most important, widely studied,  secular disciplines in the Middle Ages.
[DAVE WILL PROBABLY  PRESENT THE HANDMAIDEN CONCEPT; IF SO I SHALL ELIMINATE IT; it is on pp. 1-
Before proceeding to interpret and analyze substantive aspects of natural philosophy and theology, I would like to convey something of the overall relationship between the two disciplines, a relationship that was conditioned by the history of Christian attitudes toward pagan learning. A significant problem in the early years of Christianity was what attitude to adopt toward traditional pagan learning. Should they shun it as potentially dangerous to the faith? Should they wholeheartedly embrace it as offering important knowledge and insights about the world? Or would it be more advantageous to adopt an intermediate position?  Few if any Christians opted for wholeheartedly embracing pagan learning. But there were some who opposed the study of pagan literature on grounds that a Christian had nothing to learn from it, because science itself was often contradictory and, at best, could only give probable knowledge, not genuine truth. Many Christians had reservations about the wisdom of learning about secular subjects. In the last work he wrote, St. Augustine lamented the time he had spent  studying the seven liberal arts. What he had learned was of no use to a Christian. This attitude would never completely disappear. It continued on into the Middle Ages, when some  churchmen and scholastic authors adopted a similar attitude by regarding Sacred Scripture as self-sufficient, requiring few, if any, external aids to interpret its meaning and significance.​[1]​
 This negative attitude toward Greek philosophy was already overshadowed in the early centuries of Christianity. The sentiment that pagan philosophy and thought could not be rejected arose from an early belief that pagan thought foreshadowed Christianity and that the latter might therefore receive guidance and insight from the secular knowledge and learning of pagan authors.  The idea emerged that Christians might  take what is of value in pagan thought and use it for their own benefit, just as in Exodus  (3.22, 11.2, and 12.35), the Lord instructed Moses to plunder the wealth of the Egyptians. Another incentive for studying the philosophy and science of the pagans was to use their own words and ideas against them, just as David slew Goliath with the latter’s own sword (1 Samuel 17, 51).  From such motivations, Christians adopted the fundamental idea of using Greek philosophy and science as “handmaids to theology,” an idea traceable to Philo Judaeus (ca. 25 B.C.-A.D. 50), a Hellenized Jew, who lived in Alexandria. Philo firmly believed that a general education (consisting of what came later to be called the seven liberal arts)​[2]​ was essential to the study of philosophy, which, in turn, was necessary for comprehending revealed theology.​[3]​  Philo promoted the idea that Greek philosophy and science should be used to elucidate Scripture. That idea was adopted by such Greek Fathers as Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Gregory Nazianzen, Basil of Caesaerea, and John Damascene.   
Clement of Alexandria and Origen represent the basic attitude that  prevailed. Greek philosophy and learning were neither good nor bad in themselves, but could be one or the other, depending on how Christians used them. Although Greek philosophers and poets had not received direct revelation from God, they did receive natural reason and were heading toward the truth. Secular learning generally, and philosophy in particular, could therefore be used to prepare the way for Christian wisdom, which was the fruit of revelation. And so it was that Christians convinced themselves that philosophy and science could be studied as “handmaidens to theology.” In 235, Origen sent a letter to a future bishop of NeoCaesarea (Gregory Thaumaturgus) in which he explictly endorses the handmaiden approach. Origen urges Gregory to “direct the whole force of your intelligence to Christianity as your end.” But he also directs Gregory to take with him 
“on the one hand those parts of the philosophy of the Greeks which are fit, as it were, to serve as general or preparatory studies for Christianity, and on the other hand so much of Geometry and Astronomy as may be helpful for the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures. The children of the philosophers speak of geometry and music and grammar and rhetoric and astronomy as being ancillary to philosophy; and in the same way we might speak of philosophy itself as being ancillary to Christianity.”​[4]​
The handmaiden theory was a compromise between rejection of traditional pagan learning and its full acceptance. By approaching secular knowledge with caution, Christians could make use of Greek philosophy to better understand and explicate Holy Scripture and articles of faith. [ELIMINATE HANDMAIDEN CONCEPT TO THIS POINT.]
Although the handmaiden approach was still occasionally cited in the late Middle Ages, the outlook it was intended to nourish and support was dead. Its demise is plausibly attributable to the great influx of Greco-Islamic science and natural philosophy into the West during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and with the establishment of universities by 1200. By making the new translations, especially the works of Aristotle, the basis for a new curriculum in the arts faculties of the universities, university teaching masters were teaching and studying natural philosophy and science for their own sakes, and not for the study of Scripture and theology, since many of the arts students would never study theology. They were more likely to be studying natural philosophy, either because it was required to obtain an academic degree, or for the love of learning, but not as an aid for the better understanding of Scripture. Some theologians continued to uphold the handmaiden approach, the most prominent of them being St. Bonaventure, who regarded the secular subjects taught in the arts faculty as subordinate to theology, which was the queen of the sciences. But it was one thing to proclaim secular subjects as subordinate to theology, and quite another to demand that secular subjects like natural philosophy be studied solely to better understand Holy Scripture. Many theologians in the thirteenth century upheld the former, but no one argued that secular arts taught in the faculty of arts should be studied solely to understand Scripture. In this sense, the handmaiden theory was dead, with only occasional lip-service paid to it.
But if the handmaiden approach to pagan literature and thought was of no real significance in the late Middle Ages, problems with the works of Aristotle and the relationship between theology and natural philosophy produced other significant changes in the late thirteenth century.
Aristotle’s works were problematic almost from the time they became available in the West. In 1210, they were banned at the University of Paris, where they were not to be read in public or private, under penalty of excommunication. The ban was repeated in 1215. That the ban was of little avail is made apparent by the fact that in 1231, Pope Gregory IX allowed Aristotle’s works to be read, but ordered a commission of three theologians to purge them of offensive opinions. This also came to nought, because by 1255 at the latest, the works of Aristotle were taught in the curriculum of the faculty of arts.
Although Aristotle’s works were now taught at the University of Paristhey had always been taught at Oxfordsome influential theologians continued to feel uneasy about them. They knew that reason, as embodied in the works of Aristotle, and revelation and Scripture as they had been interpreted over the centuries, were in sharp disagreement on some fundamental issues. Where the Church assumed on the basis of Genesis that God had created the world out of nothing and would eventually destroy it, Aristotle had argued that the world had no beginning and would have no end; Christians held that every human being had an immortal soul, but Aristotle had argued that the soul perishes with the body; although he allowed that one’s rational soul might have immortality as part of a world soul, it would not enjoy individual immortality. The doctrine of the Eucharist assumed that God transforms the bread and wine of the mass into the body and blood of Christ, so that it was the case that the accidents of the bread and wine continued to exist without any substances in which to inhere. By contrast, Aristotle had argued that all accidents, without exception, must inhere in a substance. One of the most vexing problems with Aristotle’s natural philosophy was the simple fact that his natural philosophy seemed to place limits on God’s absolute power to do whatever He pleased, short of a logical contradiction. Thus, in Aristotle’s philosophy, the existence of a vacuum anywhere at all is impossible, as is the existence of other worlds beyond ours. Did this signify that if God wished to create a vacuum anywhere at all, that He could not do so? Or, if He decided to create other worlds, in addition to our world, that He could not do so because it was contrary to Aristotle’s natural philosophy? Issues such as these produced a crisis at Paris, in the 1270s. In 1270, the bishop of Paris, Etienne Tempier, condemned 13 articles that were derived from the works of Aristotle and his commentator Averroes. 
In 1272, the teaching masters in the faculty of arts instituted an oath that all its members took upon joining the faculty. The oath required that arts masters avoid consideration of theological questions in their works on natural philosophy. But if theological issues were unavoidable, the arts masters were sworn to resolve the issue in favor of the faith. The oath was a significant event in the relations between the faculties of arts and theology, because it meant that in writing on Aristotle’s natural philosophy, arts masters were to avoid theology as much as possible. By contrast, theologians in the theology faculty could introduce as much natural philosophy and logic into their theological discussions as they pleased.
Despite all their efforts to minimize Aristotle’s influence in the theological domain, the theologians were uneasy. In a final desperate effort to exert control over the way Aristotle was used, the bishop of Paris, in March, 1277, issued a condemnation of 219 articles
One of the most important aspects of the Condemnation of 1277 concerned God’s absolute power. In natural philosophy, God’s absolute power was always concerned with what we may accurately describe as “natural impossibilities.” A natural impossibility was any action or thing that was impossible by natural means in Aristotle’s natural philosophy. Hence the question often arose: were natural impossibilities also impossible for God? The theologians almost unanimously responded that God could produce or cause any natural impossibility short of a logical contradiction. Thus the 34th condemned article declared that it was an excommunicable offense to say that God could not create other worlds if He wished to do so and the 49th article condemned those who would hold that “God could not move the heavens [or world] with a rectilinear motion,” because “a vacuum would remain.” The 48th article proclaimed that “God cannot be the cause of a new act [or thing], nor can He produce something anew.” This article was condemned because it held that God cannot intervene in the world and miraculously create a new effect. While this was fine in Aristotle’s philosophy, it was unacceptable to Christians, who believed firmly that God could intervene in the world at will.
The absolute power of God would play a significant role in both natural philosophy and theology. It was the source of innumerable hypothetical discussions involving what God could, or could not, do, although one should keep in mind that scholastics introduced hypothetical assumptions without also invoking God’s power. They did so often because they thought hypothetical assumptions provided a convenient way of approaching a problem.
Theology and arts were separate disciplines: what this meant for the development of natural philosophy 
Although there were tensions between scholars in natural philosophy and theology during the thirteenth century, and theologians tried to exercise some control over the way natural philosophy was done, such efforts were largely ineffective, in no small measure because of the way medieval universities functioned. The division of a full-blown university into four faculties: arts, theology, medicine, and law helped shape the relationship between science and religion in the Middle Ages, or, more accurately, natural philosophy and theology. Each division was de facto an independent corporation in control of the subjects it taught. As long as what was taught in any of the faculties was not perceived to be in conflict with church doctrine and the faith, each of the four faculties was free to pursue its subjects, and to establish criteria for obtaining degrees in those subjects. 
Since Aristotelian natural philosophy was the primary subject taught in the arts faculty, it was largely shaped by the arts masters who had little incentive to introduce theology into their discipline, since theology was the subject matter of another faculty. Thus disciplinary boundaries between the arts and theology faculties would have kept natural philosophy relatively free of theological discussion, to say nothing of the ruling by the arts faculty at the University of Paris in 1272 that forbade arts masters from introducing theological matters into natural philosophy.
But if members of the arts faculty, as well as members of the law and medical faculties, were not to teach theology because of disciplinary boundaries, members of the faculties of theology, law, and medicine were free to use as much logic and natural philosophy in their subjects as they thought appropriate. Why? Because, in effect, the arts faculty was a service operation that provided training in logic, natural philosophy, and a few sciences, to every university student. Upon receiving their masters of arts degrees, many students would go on to one of the higher faculties to obtain a professional degree. Hence they were free to use knowledge gained in the arts facultyprimarily logic and natural philosophy since, in a real sense, they were certified as competent in those disciplines. For such reasons, there was an asymmetry among medieval faculties. Because they were untrained in theology, medicine, and law, members of the arts faculty could not import into natural philosophy subject matter that legitimately belonged to one of the higher faculties; but those who were matriculating for a degree in any of the  three professional schools, or who had degrees from one of those faculties, were free to use anything they had learned in the preparatory arts faculty. As a consequence, theologians, in their lectures and writings, used logic and natural philosophy extensively, as we shall see. Because they were usually older than arts masters, theological students who wrote commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard tended to be more sophisticated and mature in their use of natural philosophy. How they used it will be discussed later. However, I shall now describe how natural philosophy was viewed in the Middle Ages and how it was done, and then I will see how natural philosophers actually used theology and the faith in their commentaries on the relevant works of Aristotle.
WHAT IS NATURAL PHILOSOPHY?
In the broadest sense, natural philosophy was the study of change and motion in the physical world. It was one of Aristotle’s three subdivisions of theoretical knowledge, or knowledge for its own sake. Natural philosophy was concerned with physical bodies that existed separately and were capable of motion, and therefore subject to change. In truth, Aristotle’s natural philosophy was also concerned with bodies in motion that were themselves unchanging, as was assumed for all celestial bodies, which changed only with respect to position, but not otherwise. In general, Aristotle’s natural philosophy was concerned with separately existing animate and inanimate bodies that undergo change and possess an innate source of movement and rest.
The domain of natural philosophy, as the very name suggests, was the whole of nature. It did not represent any single science, but could, and did, embrace bits and pieces of all sciences. In this sense, natural philosophy was “The Mother of All Sciences.”​[5]​ For example, John Buridan, one of the most important natural philosophers in the Middle Ages, offered cogent explanations of earthquakes and mountain formation in his questions on Aristotle’s On the Heavens and in his Questions on the First Three Books of the Meteors.​[6]​ Anyone writing a history of geology would be obligated to include Buridan’s opinions as part of the overall history of the subject. And yet there was no discipline of geology until the eighteenth or nineteenth century. Indeed, Aristotle’s Meteorology served as the focal point for numerous questions about possible motions of the earth, about the ebb and flow of oceans, about lightning, and other themes that were discussed in natural philosophy long before any specific sciences had emerged to claim one or another of these subjects. In their commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics and On the Heavens, scholastic natural philosophers presented significant discussions about the causes of motion centuries before the advent of a recognized science of mathematical physics. With so many bits and pieces of sciences, and often enough significant parts of a science, embedded in natural philosophy, it is obvious that natural philosophy forms an important part of the history of many modern sciences, whether or not we choose to designate natural philosophy as science.
But medieval natural philosophy was far more significant than is indicated by the mere fact that embedded within it were bits and pieces of different modern sciences. In a culture such as that of the Middle Ages, in which the powerful tools for scientific research and inquiry were largely absent, how could nature be interpreted and analyzed in order to come to some understanding of a world that would otherwise be unknowable and inexplicable? The most powerful weapon available was human reason, employed in the manner that Aristotle had used it. The idea was to come to know what things seemed to beand this could be done by empirical means and then to determine what made them that way, a process that was largely guided by metaphysical considerations. Although “Aristotle was an indefatigable collector of facts  facts zoological, astronomical, meteorological, historical, sociological,”​[7]​ as Jonathan Barnes has put it, he relied essentially on a priori reasoning to form a picture of the structure and operation of the world. Logic and reason were used to understand the way the world had to be in order to appear and function the way it does. Medieval Latin scholars eagerly embraced Aristotle’s methodology and his approach to the physical world, while adding important ideas about the cosmos from Christian faith and theology. The conscious and systematic application of logic and reason to the natural world was the first major phase in the process that would eventually produce modern science. That first phase involved the construction of a comprehensive, intelligible system of the world, one that would permit scholars to explain in satisfactory terms a universe that would otherwise be unintelligible. As far as the Latin Middle Ages was concerned, this was brilliantly achieved in Aristotle’s natural philosophy. Without the use of controlled experiments, systematic observations, and the regular application of mathematics to physical phenomena, the only powerful tool of analysis available to those who sought to understand the structure and operation of the world was reason, applied in a largely a priori manner, based on a modicum of observation and empirical data. It was in this manner that Aristotle fashioned his natural philosophy. In the ancient and medieval worlds, Aristotle’s works represented the apotheosis of reason. Without reason, science cannot exist. It is the first indispensable element in the development of science. 
Although natural philosophy itself was not classifiable as any particular science, or as science in general, it was a discipline inherently concerned with a wide variety of scientific problems. Even more important than the specific problems, however, was the systematic way in which those problems were approached and treated. The natural philosophy that reached the Latin Middle Ages in the works of Aristotle was a highly structured, comprehensive, rational, body of knowledge. For these reasons, the subsequent institutionalization, systematization, and expansion of it in the medieval universities of Western Europe may quite appropriately be regarded as the first stage in the continuous evolution of modern science.
From the assumption that natural philosophy is concerned with bodies capable of motion and change, it would follow that natural philosophy embraces almost all inquiries concerning the physical world, ranging from the exact sciences to alchemy and astrology. But natural philosophy as a subject of study at the medieval university was somewhat more circumscribed, because it was overwhelmingly based on the works of Aristotle. Natural philosophy at the medieval university was therefore essentially Aristotelian natural philosophy. The works of Aristotle that came to constitute the core of natural philosophy were usually referred to collectively as the “natural books,” which were: Physics, On the Heavens (De caelo), On the Soul (De anima), On Generation and Corruption (De generatione et corruptione), and Meteorology. To this we might add Aristotle’s biological works, though these treatises were studied and commented relatively little by comparison to the “natural books.” 
The “Questio” form of literature in scholasticism and in natural philosophy
How were Aristotle’s works discussed and analyzed? Initially, they were discussed in a variety of forms of commentaries on the text itself. By the end of the thirteenth century, however, another method had evolved that would eventually prove the dominant form of medieval commentary on an authoritative text. Instead of commenting on the text by summarizing it section by section, the practice developed of raising questions about themes and ideas in the text. This was initially done in the classroom and then in the written texts from which masters lectured and which students studied. At first, questions were posed and discussed at the end of the commentary, but in time they completely displaced the commentary. The result was the emergence of the question form of scholastic literature, a form that became almost synonymous with scholastic method.​[8]​
Here, in brief, is the structure of a typical question:
Every question began with an enunciation of the problem, usually asking whether (utrum was the Latin term) this or that is the case. For example, “whether there could be an infinite dimension,” or “whether the earth always is at rest in the center of the universe.”​[9]​ As in a disputation, arguments were presented for or against the enunciated thesis. If the author offered a series of affirmative arguments, numbering anywhere from one to ten, he would usually end up defending a version of the negative side. Or, the reverse might obtain: the author presents a sequence of negative arguments, from which it could usually be inferred that he would ultimately defend the affirmative side. These initial arguments were called the “principal arguments” (rationes principales). They were followed by a statement of the opposite position, which might take the form “Aristotle says the opposite,” or “Aristotle determines the opposite,” or “The Commentator [Averroes] affirms the opposite,” and so on. After representing the opposite opinion, the author might then explain his understanding of the question and even define ambiguous terms. The author was now ready to express his own opinions, usually by way of distinct, numbered conclusions. When this task was completed, the author was ready for the final step, a point by point response to each of the principal arguments enunciated at the outset of the question. What follows is a schematized outline of a typical medieval question:
(1) The statement of the question; 
(2) principal arguments (rationes principales), usually representing objections to the author’s position;
(3) opposite opinion (oppositum, or sed contra), a version of which the author will defend. In support of this opinion, the author often cites a major authority, usually Aristotle, in a commentary on a work of Aristotle, or a theological authority in a theological treatise, such as a Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard;
(4) qualifications, or doubts, about the question, or about some of its terms [optional];
(5) body of argument (author’s opinions by way of sequence of conclusions);
(6) brief response to refute each principal argument.​[10]​
Many questions were often more elaborate than this bare-bones skeletal outline. In the two questions, I have handed out, the one by Nicole Oresme, on the possible plurality of worlds, adheres rather closely to the standard schema, as we can see by presenting the outline of Oresme’s question:
[1], enunciation of question; 
[2] (1)-(4), principal arguments defending the thesis that the author will almost certainly reject; 
[3], statement of the opposite opinion, a version of which the author will defend; 
[4], qualification of the question and clarification of terms; 
[5]-[8], the body of the argument expressing the author’s opinions in the form of four conclusions; and, finally, 
[9], the response to each of the four principal arguments proclaimed at the very beginning of the question. 
Although most questions follow the basic outline, some do not. The question by John Buridan (“whether the earth always is at rest in the center of the universe”) clearly does not. Buridan’s question exhibits a rather elaborate format, as can be observed from the following outline:
[1], enunciation of the question;
[2] (1)-(4), principal arguments;
[3], statement of Buridan’s opposition to claim asserted in [2];
[4] (1)-(4), qualification of the question by posing four doubts about the earth;
[5], fourth doubt elaborated in considerable detail;
[6] (1)-(5), five persuasive arguments (“persuasions”) in favor of the earth’s rotation;
[7]-[11], five arguments based on empirical evidence, or “appearances;” 
appearances [7] to [10] are  compatible with the possible rotation of the earth; 
appearance [11] offers evidence from impetus theory that demonstrates why earth cannot rotate;  
[12], probable arguments against the earth’s rotation;
[13] (1),(2),(3),(5), four arguments to repudiate the persuasive arguments in favor of the earth’s rotation in section [6] (persuasion [6] (4) is ignored);
[14] (1)-(5), five additional doubts about the question raised and answered;
[15] (1)-(4), response to each of the four principal arguments presented at the outset ([2] (1)-(4)).
In the questions method that was typical of medieval scholasticism, the objective was to present the best arguments for both sides and, ultimately, to explain why one alternative was preferred over the other. To achieve this goal one had to be perfectly clear about the meaning of the question, for which reason it was not uncommon to explain and qualify terms used in the question itself, as we saw above, where Oresme sought to explain how he would understand the terms “world” and “possible.”​[11]​
The two questions translated above are models of medieval scholastic argumentation, whatever one might think about the quality of the substantive arguments. They are highly structured and rational treatments of important questions in natural philosophy and capture the essence of the scholastic method and the scholastic way of treating problems in natural philosophy. Medieval natural philosophy at the medieval universities was comprised of hundreds of such questions. For centuries, masters and students were conditioned to treat questions in natural philosophy as if they were listening to, or reading about, a disputation between two scholars, each defending a position contrary to the other. In formulating a response to a question, an author had to take account of one, or more, opposing opinions. The structure of the question format required it.  
THE IMPACT OF THEOLOGY AND FAITH ON NATURAL PHILOSOPHY
In treating the science-religion relationship during the Middle Ages, or more accurately the natural philosophy-theology relationship, we must face up to some recent claims about that relationship. Andrew Cunningham has recently argued that the traditional problem about the mutual influences of science, or natural philosophy, and religion is pointless. It is a non-problem because it assumes that the strict separation of science and religion in the modern world also applies to the relationship of natural philosophy and theology in the 17th century and earlier. But this is false. Cunningham argues that, in the seventeenth century and earlier, natural philosophy was 
about God and His creation, because that is what the point of natural philosophy as a discipline and subject was. Hence each and every variety of natural philosophy that was put forward was an argument for particular and specific views of God.
And near the conclusion of his article, Cunningham proclaims that 
natural philosophy as such was a discipline and subject-area whose role and point was the study of God’s creation and God’s attributes.​[12]​ 
Is it true, as Cunningham argues, that natural philosophy is always about God, God’s attributes, and His creation? Were religion and natural philosophy not distinct during the Middle Ages? In the course of teaching and studying Aristotle's natural books in the arts faculties of medieval universities for more than three centuries, a vast body of commentary literature was produced.​[13]​ Those who wrote these treatises firmly believed that, by His supernatural power, God had created the world from nothing, and was the ultimate cause, or the First Cause (prima causa), as He was frequently called, of all events or effects. But did these Christian beliefs affect the way medieval scholars wrote natural philosophy? Did it mean that their objective in doing natural philosophy was essentially theological or religious; that their aim was to transform natural philosophy into an instrument for the defense and explication of the faith and therefore to intrude as much religious material as possible into their investigations into natural questions? 
While I doubt that Cunningham’s depiction of natural philosophy is accurate for the seventeenth century, which is the main focal point of his article, it is completely erroneous when applied to medieval natural philosophy. Let us see why. 
During the Middle Ages, theology and natural philosophy were recognized as distinct disciplines, each taught in its own university faculty.​[14]​ Hence it is wholly appropriate to treat them as distinct disciplines, and simply false to claim that “the distinction between ‘science’ and theology is a modern day distinction which cannot legitimately be applied to the practice of natural philosophy in the seventeenth and other centuries.”​[15]​ We must also keep in mind the fact that those who commented on the natural books of Aristotle were usually teaching masters in arts faculties, although many would eventually matriculate in a theology faculty and become professional theologians. When they wrote their Aristotelian commentaries, however, they had every incentive to keep their natural philosophy natural, if not by their own inclination, then by command of their own faculty. Under pressure from theologians and the theological faculty of the University of Paris, who were alarmed at the manner in which some arts masters taught natural philosophy, the arts faculty itself, in 1272, instituted an oath that made it mandatory for arts masters to avoid theological discussions in their questions. Where this was unavoidable, they were sworn to resolve the issue in favor of the faith.​[16]​ Even in universities that had no such oath, arts masters would rarely have considered theological issues in their treatises on natural philosophy. It simply was not done, because all arts masters knew the boundary conditions. [THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION OBLITERATED THOSE BOUNDARY CONDITIONS. SEE BELOW WHERE I BRIEFLY DISCUSS THIS] Although theology masters who wrote treatises on natural philosophy could have imported theology into their natural philosophy, they rarely did, as we shall see. They relegated theological issues to theological treatises.  
The most appropriate way to test the validity of Cunningham’s claim that “natural philosophy as such was a discipline and subject-area whose role and point was the study of God’s creation and God’s attributes,” is to examine relevant texts of natural philosophy as written by those who were consciously doing natural philosophy, not theology. That is, we must carefully inspect treatises on natural philosophy per se, not treatises on theology that used natural philosophy in the service of theology (I examine theological treatises later). To achieve this I have examined all of the questions in the following five treatises, which constitute the core of Aristotle’s natural philosophy: 59 questions in John Buridan’s Questions on On the Heavens (De caelo); 35 questions in Albert of Saxony’s Questions on On Generation and Corruption; 107 questions in Albert of Saxony’s Questions on the Physics; 65 questions in Themon Judaeus’s Questions on the Meteors; and 44 questions in Nicole Oresme’s Questions on On the Soul (De anima), for a grand total of 310 questions.​[17]​ 
An examination of the 310 questions embedded in these five treatises shows clearly that most of the questions had little to do with God, the faith, or theology, but were concerned solely with issues in natural philosophy. Of the 310 questions, 217 are free of any entanglement with theology or faith. Inspection of any of the 217 questions would not reveal whether the author was Christian, Muslim, Jewish, agnostic, or atheist. The remaining 93 questions, approximately 29 percent, mention God and the faith. Of the 93 with at least a trace of theological sentiment, 53 mention God, or something about the faith, in a cursory manner; of the remaining 40 questions, 10 have relatively detailed discussions about God or the faith.   
Of the 93 instances where God and the faith are mentioned, 80 fall into three significant categories most of which appear in only three of the five treatises: Questions on the Physics, Questions on De caelo, and Questions on De anima (very few occur in Questions on Generation and Corruption and Questions on the Meteorology). Examination of such works on natural philosophy makes it apparent that in most instances where God and matters of faith are intruded into commentaries and questions on Aristotle's natural books, they occur primarily in one of three categories or contexts. 
Category 1: 
Twelve of the 93 questions mention positions and arguments, usually those by Aristotle or Averroes, that are contrary to the faith. For example, in his Questions on De anima (bk. 3, qu. 7), Nicole Oresme argues against Averroes’ assumption of a single intellect, when he says that “the opposite is obvious from faith and according to truth. Nor is it probable  indeed it is unthinkablethat my intellect is your intellect or [the intellect] of another who is in Rome or elsewhere.”​[18]​ In his Questions on the Physics, Albert of Saxony asks “whether there always was motion and always will be motion.”​[19]​ He explains that “Aristotle and the Commentator argue the opposite in this eighth [book]. I respond first to this question according to the way that Aristotle and the Commentator respond. Secondly, we must respond to it according to the truth.”​[20]​ When Albert arrives at the point where he must respond with the truth, he proclaims that “according to our faith and the truth of the matter, sometimes a motion begins which some motion does not precede.  And this occurs in this manner: that there was a prime mover eternally, although there was not a prime mobile eternally. But at sometime it [the prime mobile] began and then motion began.”​[21]​ Thus did Albert of Saxony opt for the faith against Aristotle and Averroes. Where Aristotle and Averroes insisted that motion had no beginning and is eternal, Albert argues according to “our faith,” that motion did have a beginning and that it began when God created the prime mobile, or first movable sphere. 
After presenting arguments for both sides of a question that inquired whether an immobile heaven should be assumed beyond the mobile heavens, that is, whether there is an empyrean heaven, John Buridan also invoked the faith and declares that “you may choose any side you please. But, because of the arguments of the theologians, I choose the first part [that is, the existence of a resting, empyrean heaven].” But he goes on to defend the faith when he says: “And one can reply to Aristotle’s argument that he assumes many things against Catholic truth because he wished to assume nothing that could not be deduced from the senses and experience. Thus it is not necessary to believe Aristotle in many things, namely where he clashes with Sacred Scripture.”​[22]​
Category 2:
Thirty-four questions mention God and faith by way of analogy or example. Thus Oresme presents a supposition in which he says “that some power makes this or that operation anew without changing itself, just as is obvious with God who continuously produces new effects without any change in Himself.”​[23]​ Similarly, Buridan declares that “Just as all order in the world arises from God, so does order arise in a city from a prince.”​[24]​
Category 3:
Another thirty-four of the 93 questions are concerned with some aspect of God’s absolute power, which was the most significant source for manufacturing counterfactuals in the Middle Ages, some of which raised important questions about motion, other worlds, and the infinite. The numerous appeals to God’s absolute power bear witness to the fact that natural philosophy was not just about God and His creation, but also about what God had not created, but could create by virtue of His omnipotence. Among numerous invocations of God’s absolute power we may mention that God could create as many other worlds as He pleases;​[25]​ that He could move our world with a rectilinear motion;​[26]​ that He could separate a quantity from its extension;​[27]​ that beyond our world, He could create a corporeal space and any corporeal substances He pleases;​[28]​ and that God could create a vacuum by annihilating all matter below the concave surface of the lunar orb.​[29]​  In short, by His omnipotence, God was always assumed capable of doing anything whatever that was impossible in Aristotle’s natural philosophy, provided that it did not involve a logical contradiction.​[30]​ 
Although God was deemed capable of doing these naturally impossible acts, it did not follow that He had done them. In fact, we must assume that most natural philosophers and theologians who invoked God’s absolute power did not believe that God had actually performed the act that He was assumed capable of. Thus John Buridan conceded that God could create a finite space of any size beyond the world. He then insists that we should seek no other reason for such an action than the simple desire of God to do so. “But, nevertheless,” says Buridan, “I think that there is no space [beyond the world], namely [any space] beyond the bodies that appear to us and that we must believe [exist] on the basis of sacred Scripture.”​[31]​ 
Appeals to God’s absolute power had little, if any, religious motivation or content. Wherever we find it used in Aristotelian questions and commentaries, it is almost never intended to make a religious point. It simply became a convenient vehicle for the introduction of subtle and imaginative questions, the responses to which compelled natural philosophers to apply Aristotelian natural philosophy to situations and conditions that were impossible in Aristotle’s natural philosophy. In the process, some of Aristotle’s fundamental principles were challenged. The invocation of God’s absolute power made many aware that things might be quite otherwise than were dreamt of in Aristotle’s philosophy.
To underscore the fact that medieval natural philosophy was about the natural, not supernatural, operations of the world, it is important to recognize that in almost any given question (questio) in which some element of theology has been introduced, the invocations of religious or theological material usually occupies a small percentage of the total question. Let us recall that of the 310 questions in the five treatises that formed the basis of my investigation of Aristotelian natural philosophy in the fourteenth century (see above), 217 had nothing whatever on God or the faith and only 93 did. Of the 93, however, most had relatively little on theology. For example, in his Questions on the Physics, Albert of Saxony asks whether ‘from the addition of some whole to some whole another whole is made; similarly, [whether] by the removal of some whole from some whole, another whole is made.’​[32]​ Of the 201 lines of text in this question, 10 are devoted to the fourth and fifth (of ten) principal arguments in which Albert rejects the proposition as follows:
Fourthly, it would follow that none of us would be baptized. But this is false and the consequence is proved because many particles are added to us. And thus we are greater than when we were baptized. Therefore by addition of some part to the whole there occurs another whole. Therefore it follows that none of us is the same whole which we were in [our] youth, and, consequently, none of us is that [person] which was baptized. 
Fifthly, by similar reasoning, it would follow that none of us is the one who was born of his mother, just as Christ was not the same man who was suspended on the cross and who was born of the purest virgin. 
Not only do these arguments constitute a small portion of the whole question  slightly less than five percent  but the discussions about baptism and Christ are examples, and could have been replaced by other examples of a non-religious character. Moreover, within the structure of a typical question, the principal arguments and the responses to them at the beginning and end of the question, respectively, represent the least important parts. Between them lies the body of the question in which the author presents his main conclusions and qualifications. In the question we are discussing, the religious component occurs only in the principal arguments (indeed Albert does not even respond to them) and not in the body of the question. Thus they play no significant role in the question.
Because fewer than one-third of the 310 questions considered here had theologically relevant material, and most include much less than five percent that pertains to God, the faith, or church doctrine (indeed more than half of the references are little more than passing mentions of God or some aspect of the faith and play insubstantive roles in their respective questions), we may rightly conclude that God and faith played little role in medieval natural philosophy. If natural philosophy was really about God and His creation, why did medieval natural philosophers virtually ignore these themes in their questions? The answer is obvious: because they were irrelevant to their objective, which was to provide natural explanations for natural phenomena. Perhaps, the most important reason why theology did not significantly penetrate natural philosophy is simply that while theology needed natural philosophy, natural philosophy did not need theology.  
Did theologians “theologize” their treatises on natural philosophy? 
It is obvious that religion and theology played a minimal role in treatises on Aristotle’s natural philosophy, and, by a process of extrapolation, we may say that they played little role in the works of medieval natural philosophers as a whole. But what about theologians who wrote treatises on natural philosophy; or, more specifically, wrote commentaries on one or more of Aristotle’s natural books? Were they more likely to “theologize” their treatises? To answer this question, we can do no better than to examine the commentaries on Aristotle’s natural philosophy by two of the greatest theologians in the Middle Ages, Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, who were already masters of theology when they wrote their commentaries on the natural books of Aristotle. As professional theologians, both were free to insert thoughts about God and the faith in their treatises on natural philosophy, wherever such thoughts might be deemed appropriate. Examination of their relevant treatises in natural philosophy shows unequivocally that both chose to keep the theologization of natural philosophy to a minimum. Let us see what they regarded as a proper approach to natural philosophy. 
In the opening words of his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, Albertus Magnus declares that his Dominican brothers had implored him to “compose a book on physics for them of such a sort that in it they would have a complete science of nature and that from it they might be able to understand in a competent way the books of Aristotle.”​[33]​ Perhaps thinking that his fellow friars would expect him to intermingle theological ideas with natural philosophy, Albertus declares that he will not speak about divine inspirations, as do some “extremely profound theologians,” because such matters “can in no way be known by means of arguments derived from nature.” And he then explains that
Pursuing what we have in mind, we take what must be termed ‘physics’ more as what accords with the opinion of Peripatetics than as anything we might wish to introduce from our own knowledge. . . for if, perchance, we should have any opinion of our own, this would be proffered by us (God willing) in theological works  rather than in those on physics.​[34]​
Albertus thus believed that Aristotle’s natural philosophy was to be treated naturally, in the customary manner of Peripatetics. Where theological issues might be involved, they were to be treated in theological treatises. In his Commentary on De caelo, Albertus makes it evident that he wished to uphold his basic conviction that, unless unavoidable, theology should not be intruded into natural philosophy. In discussing whether the heaven is ungenerable and incorruptible, Albertus explains that 
“Another opinion was that of Plato who says that the heaven was derived from the first cause by creation from nothing, and this opinion is also the opinion of the three laws, namely of the Jews, Christians, and Saracens. And thus they say that the heaven is generated, but not from something. But with regard to this opinion, it is not relevant for us to treat it here.”​[35]​
Because he sought to avoid theology, Albertus says that he will therefore only inquire about a third opinion,
which says that the heaven is generated from something preexisting and is corrupted into something that remains after it, just as natural things are generated and corrupted by the actions of qualities acting and being acted on mutually. And because these things alone proceed naturally and from principles of nature, we inquire about this mode, [namely] whether the heaven is generated.​[36]​
Thus Albertus will speak not about the generation of the heaven from nothing, which is only possible supernaturally, but about its generation from something preexisting, which is naturally possible, even though it conflicts with a fundamental doctrine of his faith. 
It is undoubtedly because of his conviction that a theologian doing natural philosophy should avoid theological discussions to the greatest extent possible that we find relatively little about God and the faith in Albertus’s Commentary on De caelo.​[37]​ The subject of the third tractate of the first book is “whether there is one world or more” (Utrum mundus sit unus vel plures),​[38]​ a theme that often produced mentions of God. Albertus, however, explains that
If . . . someone should say that there can be more worlds but there are not, because God could have made more worlds if He wished and even now could make more worlds, if He wishes. Against this, I do not dispute, since here I conclude that it is impossible that there be several worlds and that it is necessary that there be one [world] only. Here we understand about [i.e., we are concerned about] the impossible and necessary  that is, [we are concerned about] the world with regard to its essential and proximate causes. And there is a great difference between what God can do by means of his absolute power and what can be done in nature [or by nature].​[39]​
With respect “to the nature of the world,” Albertus says that “there cannot be more worlds, although God could make more, if He wishes.”​[40]​ It is not, however, what God can do that interests Albertus in his Commentary on De caelo, but what nature can do. He concludes that nature cannot produce other worlds by its own powers. At the end of the first book, Albertus emphasizes that investigators into nature do not inquire about how God uses the things He has created to make a miracle in order to proclaim his power; but, rather, they investigate “what could be done in natural things according to the inherent causes of nature.”​[41]​
Albertus kept theological references in his natural philosophy to a minimum, as is evident in his Aristotelian commentaries. In the 261 chapters that comprise the eight books of his Commentary on the Physics, Albertus mentions God (deus and its variants) in 24, or in approximately nine percent of his chapters; and in the 111 chapters that make up the four books of his Commentary on De caelo, he mentions God in 9, or in approximately 8 percent of the total. Most of Albertus’s uses of the term God in his Commentary on the Physics are in direct response to Aristotle’s text, especially in the eighth book. Thus of the 64 occurrences of primus motor, that is, first mover, or God, 55 occur in book eight; of the 69 occurrences of causa prima, that is, first cause, or God, 37 occur in book eight; and of the 78 occurrences of deus, God, 40 occur in the eighth book.
Most of these occurrences are in direct response to Aristotle’s own mentions of God, or gods, or something about divinity. They have nothing to do with considerations of faith or theology. But Albertus unhesitatingly defends the faith against those who offer conflicting interpretations. One of the most serious claims that required a defense was Aristotle’s arguments for the eternity of the world, which, if ignored, would have denied the creation. A major locus for these arguments was the eighth book of Aristotle’s Physics, where Aristotle argued more specifically for the eternity of motion. To these kinds of arguments, Albertus replies in a chapter in which he demonstrates that the world began by a creation.​[42]​
Many mentions of the Christian God are minimal, little more than passing references, as when Albertus, in presenting eight ways in which something can be in another, says that “sometimes it is internal, namely when form is a mover with respect to place, just as the soul in a body and God (deus) in the world;”​[43]​ or, in a discussion of time, when Albertus says that ‘they say that, when it is said that God is “now” (nunc), and an intelligence is “now”, and a motion is “now”, the same “now” is denoted.’​[44]​ In the two instances just cited, Albertus’s usage conforms to that common category where theological terms and concepts are used analogically, or to exemplify and illustrate things and processes in the natural world. Of equal interest is the fact that the parts of their respective chapters which these two specific instances comprise are miniscule. 
As a theologian, Albertus could easily have inserted passages about God almost anywhere in his physical commentaries. For example, in his lengthy commentary on the infinite, extending over thirty-two double columned pages,​[45]​ it might have been tempting to elaborate on God’s infinite powers. But Albertus mentions God only twice: once in a context describing the way in which Presocratic philosophers used the term infinite,​[46]​ and again, by way of example, in the first of five ways in which the infinite is described, a privative one, where Albertus says that ‘God (deus) is said to be infinite (infinitus) and incorporeal (incorporeus) and immense (immensus)’,​[47]​ that is, God is ‘not finite’; God is ‘not a body’; and God is ‘not measurable’. Indeed, Albertus ignores a good opportunity to invoke God when, within the context of the infinite, he launches into a discussion of extracosmic space, place, and vacuum.​[48]​ In theological treatises, it was common to involve God with space, place, and vacuum. Albertus could easily have done so had he wished. Also surprising is the fact that in his discussion of the celestial orbs in his Commentary on De caelo, where he speaks of ten orbs, Albertus makes no mention of the crystalline orb and the Empyrean heaven, the traditional theological spheres.​[49]​ 
Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1224-1274) preserved the approach which Albertus Magnus developed toward Aristotelian natural philosophy. Like Albertus, Thomas sought to minimize theological intrusions into his commentaries on the natural books of Aristotle. The relatively few occurrences of key terms such as “God,” “faith,” “creation,” “first mover,” and “first cause” in Thomas’s commentaries on the Physics and On the Heavens, and their near total absence from his commentaries on On Generation and Corruption (De generatione et corruptione) and the Meteorology strongly support this interpretation. 
In Thomas’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, we find almost all mentions of God and its medieval scholastic synonyms, as well as all appeals to faith, embedded in the eighth book, a feature that is also true of Albertus Magnus’s Commentary on the Physics (see above). Only a few isolated citations occur in the rest of his lengthy commentary. This is striking, but not startling, since Aristotle’s major demonstration of a first mover in the eighth book caused Thomas, and all who commented on that book, to speak frequently of the first mover and, consequently, to find occasions to mention God. In view of long-held attitudes and opinions about the role of theology and faith in natural philosophy, the relatively few citations that Thomas made involving theology and the faith come as a surprise. A statistical count supports this interpretation when we realize that Thomas found occasion to mention God in only 21 paragraphs out of 2,550;​[50]​ that the 54 occurrences of “Prime Mover” and its variants occur in 43 paragraphs; that the ten usages of “First Cause” occur in 10 paragraphs; and that matters of faith are mentioned in only 8 paragraphs. If we sum 21, 43, 10, and 8, we arrive at a total of 82 differently numbered paragraphs. Allowing for overlap in two paragraphs, the total number of paragraphs in which some version of God’s name or mention of the faith appears is 80, of which 69 are in the eighth book, leaving 11 for the other seven books. The 80 paragraphs represent approximately 3 percent of the 2550 paragraphs. 
Like Albertus, Thomas also refrained from introducing theological ideas into natural philosophy. Thus in his Commentary on De caelo,​[51]​ Thomas, like Roger Bacon and Albertus Magnus, makes no mention of the empyrean heaven, although Thomas and Albertus, who both accepted its existence, found occasion to mention it in their theological treatises.​[52]​
Thomas frequently indicates where Aristotle disagrees with the faith. In 1271, however, near the end of his life, he explained why he did not often mix matters of faith with natural philosophy. In considering a question on the rational soul in man, he seemingly dismisses the question, by asserting that “I don’t see what one’s interpretation of the text of Aristotle has to do with the teaching of the faith.”​[53]​  In Vernon Bourke’s judgment, Aquinas did not think he was “required to make Aristotle speak like a Christian” and he undoubtedly “thought that a scholarly commentary on Aristotle was a job by itself, not to be confused with apologetics or theology.”​[54]​
What are we to make of all this? We may plausibly infer that the overall impact of specific ideas about God and the faith were quite modest and should not alter the conception that the content of late medieval natural philosophy was fundamentally about natural phenomena studied in an essentially rational manner. Natural philosophy was never significantly infiltrated by theology, and natural philosophy was never really about God and His attributes. It was, of course about God’s creation, but it was about that creation as a rational construction that could only be understood by reason.
Natural philosophy and theology as different disciplines
Theology and faith did not penetrate natural philosophy because they were different disciplines. Natural philosophy was taught in the arts faculties of medieval universities, while theology was taught in theology faculties. As we saw earlier, natural philosophers at the University of Paris were not to introduce theological ideas into their works, although theologians could use natural philosophy in their theological treatises. Thus by the very nature of its subject matter, and by the restriction on introducing theology into natural philosophy, the latter found itself relatively free from theology, except in the ways described earlier in this chapter.  
Difficulty in injecting theology into natural philosophy 
An even more fundamental reason prevented the meaningful intrusion of theology into natural philosophy. It is difficult to inject theology into explanations of natural phenomena. Whenever a theological explanation is given in natural philosophy, it converts what should have been a natural explanation to a supernatural explanation and, consequently, defeats the very purpose of a treatise on natural philosophy, which is to explain phenomena by natural causes. If this were done to any extent, the treatise in question would no longer be a work in natural philosophy, but would have been converted to one on theology. Conversely, the more natural philosophy you introduce into theology, the less supernatural does it become, as we shall see. Everyone seems to have implicitly recognized this in the Middle Ages. The boundaries between theology and natural philosophy were rarely blurred beyond recognition.  
[START HERE: Sunday, June 13, 1999 (3:26 PM)] By the seventeenth century, the disciplinary boundaries between theology and natural philosophy no longer existed. One could indeed discourse about God in natural philosophy. But how would discoursing about God advance natural philosophy? It would not and could not. When the great natural philosopher, Sir Isaac Newton, a devout individual who was immersed in religious thought, wrote his monumental treatise in mathematical physics, The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, first published in 1687, he found occasion to mention God only once in the entire work, in book three. Apparently regretting even this action, Newton deleted mention of God from that passage in subsequent editions.​[55]​ As if in replacement of that passage, Newton added his famous General Scholium to the end of the second edition (1713). In a work of 530 pages, Newton saw fit to discourse upon God only in the last four pages, where he praises the deity as the Universal Ruler and Supreme God, and enunciates some of God’s attributes. Coming to the end of his encomium on the deity, Newton declares: “And thus much concerning God; to discourse of whom from the appearances of things, does certainly belong to Natural Philosophy.”​[56]​ In the Middle Ages, when theology and natural philosophy were separate disciplines, it was the responsibility of theology, not natural philosophy, to discourse about God. But the Protestant Reformation and much else had destroyed the jurisdictional boundaries between theology and natural philosophy. When Newton wrote, it was regarded as wholly appropriate for a natural philosopher to discourse about God. And yet Newton found few places where he could do so substantively and effectively. Other than singing the praises of the deity, Newton found very little to say about God. Indeed, even the General Scholium was introduced only because of criticisms levelled against Newton’s use of attractions and repulsions, which made his system seem mechanical, much like that of Descartes.​[57]​ In the General Scholium, Newton emphasizes that only God could have produced the cosmos. “Blind metaphysical necessity, which is certainly the same always and everywhere, could produce no variety of things.”​[58]​ But after the conclusion of his worshipful tribute to God, Newton, in the final two paragraphs of his great work, admits that he has not yet found the cause of gravity. It is enough for us, he says, “that gravity does really exist, and act according to the laws which we have explained, and abundantly serves to account for all the motions of the celestial bodies, and of our sea.”​[59]​ Why did Newton not attribute the cause of gravity to God? It would almost have followed from the immediately preceding three-page discourse on God’s power and attributes, as his brilliant biographer, Richard S. Westfall, recognized.​[60]​ But Newton did not do so. Why not? Probably because he recognized that such an explanation would have been to no avail. It would have explained nothing. If you believe that God has created our world and all of its operations, then you cannot invoke God to function as an explanation for the cause of any particular effect. You must assume that God provided a natural cause for that effect, and it is the task of the natural philosopher to discover it. Theologians and natural philosophers, many of whom were both theologian and natural philosopher, recognized this essential feature of natural philosophy. It explains why, from the Middle Ages onward, natural philosophy remained relatively free of theological encroachments. And it also makes it quite plausible to believe that natural philosophy is the real precursor of modern science. Its methods were rational and systematic by the very nature of the discipline. Theology and faith could not enter it in any significant manner because to do so would transform natural philosophy into theology. 
In a perceptive analysis of the relations between science and religion, George M. Marsden declared that
Scientists and technicians of all sorts, no matter how religious, are expected to check their religious beliefs when they enter the laboratory. Of course, they may pray about their work, and perhaps when they are done ponder how nature reflects God’s design; but the activity itself will be, for methodological purposes, essentially secular.​[61]​
 Medieval natural philosophers, many of whom were devout Christians, acted similarly. They considered issues in terms of logic and reason and evidence. When they did introduce religion or faith into their deliberations, it was almost always because they could not avoid it. Theology and faith were for theological treatises, not for treatises on natural philosophy. 
It is appropriate to view the relations of medieval natural philosophy and theology as bilateral, though very unevenly bilateral. If natural philosophy was viewed by theologians as the handmaid to theology, it is no exaggeration to view much of the theology that was intruded into natural philosophy as the handmaid to natural philosophy, simply because it served the needs of natural philosophy. This is true for the theology that was introduced for analogical and comparative purposes, as well as for the appeals to God’s absolute power, which enabled natural philosophers and theologians to extend the range of their discussions, while also reserving to themselves the option of denying that God had in fact produced the counterfactuals they were discussing. All agreed, for example, that God could make other worlds, or that He could create a vacuum anywhere within or beyond the world, but no natural philosopher in the Middle Ages believed that God had actually done so.​[62]​ 
The theology that was intruded into treatises on natural philosophy was not theology for its own sake, but was solely intended to elucidate this or that question in natural philosophy. Only aspects of natural philosophy that were contrary-to-faith were affected by theological considerations. But the responses to contrary-to-faith conditions, most of them associated with Aristotle’s arguments for an eternal world, became routine and did not affect the substantive character of natural philosophy.  Following a perfunctory bow to faith, an author could assume the eternity of the world hypothetically and pursue a variety of arguments. Because natural philosophy remained a highly rational discipline throughout the Middle Ages, theology never transformed natural philosophy. Indeed, it never really tried. In fact, while natural philosophy was largely independent of theology, theology, as we shall now see, was utterly dependent on natural philosophy. 
IMPACT OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY ON THEOLOGY
I shall now speak briefly about the impact of natural philosophy on theology. That may come as a surprise. In discussions about the relationship of science and religion, or natural philosophy and theology, the focus is always on how religion influenced science, rather than on how science may have influenced religion or theology. But during the Middle Ages, we can easily see the role natural philosophy and logic played in shaping theology. Indeed, we may as well say it at the outset: the theologians became so dependent on natural philosophy and logic to interpret theological problems that they effectively secularized their discipline. We can see this in a number of ways. 
To appreciate the kind of discipline theology became, it is important to know that at the very beginning of a commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, the first question commentators confronted was “whether theology is a science?” In posing this question, theologians were inquiring whether theology is a science in the Aristotelian sense of science, namely science as demonstrative knowledge in the form of a syllogism derived from premisses that are “true, necessary, certain, immediate, and appropriate to the phenomenon to be explained.”​[63]​ Responses to this question varied greatly over the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Most theologians regarded theology as “the queen of the sciences,” but they did not think it was a science in the strict sense. But this was not because it was thought inferior to legitimate sciences, but rather because it was usually assumed superior to all of them. Because theology relied ultimately on revelation, many theologians viewed its knowledge and wisdom as transcending that of the secular sciences. Thomas Aquinas is usually regarded as the medieval scholar who most emphatically assigned scientific status to theology in his discussion of the question, although whether Thomas thought theology was a science in the strict Aristotelian sense is unclear and is still debated. Science as Aristotle described it was the model on which theologians tried to establish their own discipline. Hence they proceeded as if it were a science and used rigorous argumentation wherever possible.​[64]​ “Theology still had its origin in divine revelation as communicated in Sacred Scripture and tradition and had as it goal man’s salvation. But its method now involved more than ever before intellectual speculative investigation. Theology employed a scientific discourse not unlike that of other disciplines, and the doctor of theology was its trained expert. He enquired, argued and taught by rational and analytical methods.”​[65]​ By the thirteenth century, “the scales had been definitively tipped in favor of a rational conception of theology, as faith seeking understanding, as an investigation of the data of revelation with the help of the sources of reason.”​[66]​ Despite a few noteworthy exceptions, the overwhelming mass of rational theology is found in commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard.​[67]​ 
Based on the firm conviction that theology was in some sense a science, or at the very least a discipline that required the use of analytic techniques, scholastic theologians repeatedly applied those techniques to the questions they sought to resolve. A few examples will convey the flavor of this vast enterprise and will enable us to see how logic and natural philosophy were regularly imported into theology. One of the most powerful logical tools theologians used was the law of non-contradiction where it was assumed that not even God could perform a contradiction. Richard of Middleton asks “whether God could do contradictory things simultaneously.”​[68]​ In his response, Richard exhibits one of the most characteristic features of medieval theology: the heavy reliance on natural philosophy. He utilizes examples from major themes in natural philosophy to show that God cannot perform a contradiction. In the end, Richard concludes that God cannot perform contradictory actions. “I respond,” he declares,  
that God cannot make two contradictories exist simultaneously, not because of any deficiency in his power, but because it does not make any sense to [His] power in any way. And if you should ask why this does not make possible sense, it must be said that with respect to this [problem] no other argument can be given except that such is the nature, or the disposition, of affirmation and negation, just as if we sought why every whole comprehends a part, no other argument would be forthcoming than that such is the nature of whole and part.​[69]​
Theologians incessantly inquired whether God could perform this or that act. The objective was to determine whether God could or could not do something by applying the law of non-contradiction. If no contradiction was involved, God could do the act; if there was a contradiction He could not do it. For example, here are two typical questions posed by Hugolin of Orvieto in the fourteenth century:
Vol. 2: Book 1, Distinction 40:

Question 3, art. 3  (p.341): “Whether God could make the future not to be?”
Vol. 3: Book 2, Distinction 2:
Unique question, art. 3 (pp. 97-99): “Whether God could make a creature exist for only an instant?”
Other questions by other authors are:
whether God could have made the world before He made it (Richard of Middleton);​[70]​
whether God knew that He would create a world from eternity (Robert Holkot);​[71]​ 
whether God could do evil things (Richard of Middleton);​[72]​
whether the Creator could have created things better than He did (William of Auvergne, De universo);​[73]​
whether God could make a better world than this world (Gabriel Biel);​[74]​
whether God could make the humanity of Christ better than it is (Thomas Aquinas);​[75]​
whether, without any change in Himself, God could not want something that at some [earlier] time he had wanted; and the contrary (Johannes Bassolis);​[76]​
whether if God wants something new that He did not want from eternity, would this constitute a real change [in God] (Thomas of Strasbourg).​[77]​

EXAMPLES OF THE USE OF LOGIC:
A common use of logic involved situations in which theologians were enco uraged to introduce situations in which God is imagined to do an act that is naturally impossible in Aristotle’s physical world, but which might or might not be logically possible. For example, Gabriel Biel asked “whether bare prime matter could be separated from any whatever form and stand [by itself].” In his reply, Biel says that “although matter cannot stand by itself by means of a natural power, it can, by the divine power, be separated from every form, both substantial and accidental, and separately preserved.” The fundamental reason for this, says Biel, is “Because nothing, which does not imply a contradiction, must be denied to God’s power; but matter standing by itself does not imply a contradiction; therefore, etc.”​[78]​ Here God could separate matter from form because it did not involve a logical contradiction.
I offer another example from Gregory of Rimini, who asked  “Whether God, by His absolute power, could do every possible thing that could be done.” As a subquestion within the larger question, Gregory wants to determine if God could make someone sin. Gregory says that it is possible that some man, say Peter, sins, but God cannot make Peter sin. For “if God made Peter sin, God would wish Peter to do what He [God] does not wish him to do; or, He would wish him not to do what He does not wish him not to do [that is, God wishes him not to do what He wishes him to do]. Each of these implies a contradiction. And the consequence is obvious, because God can do nothing except what He wishes to do; and so, if He made Peter sin He [obviously] wishes Peter to sin. However, no one can sin except either by doing what God does not wish him to do; or, by not doing what God does not wish him not to do [that is, by not doing what God wishes him to do].”​[79]​ In effect, if God makes Peter sin, He would  make Peter do what He does not really want Peter to do. Thus God would contradict Himself. Or, if God  makes Peter sin, He would want Peter not to do what He wants Peter to do. And here again, God  would contradict Himself. Therefore each of these possibilities or alternatives implies a contradiction. The conclusion is that God cannot make Peter sin.
In the next paragraph, Gregory declares further that “if God would make Peter sin, Peter would sin and not sin. That he would sin [if God wanted him to sin] is obvious; but that he would not sin is now proved: because no one sins by doing what God wishes him to do or makes him do . . . . It is therefore obvious, properly speaking, that God cannot make Peter sin.”​[80]​ This is a typical kind of logical argument that medieval theologians introduced over and over again into their theological questions. 
HOW SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGIANS USED NATURAL PHILOSOPHY IN THEOLOGY:
Natural philosophy was used in varying degrees in any given question that might be posed in a commentary on the Sentences. The question might be completely and totally about natural philosophy and have virtually nothing about theology; or it might be largely about theology but draw considerable support from natural philosophy.  To illustrate the first category of questions that are totally about natural philosophy, let me cite  some questions that appeared in both Sentence Commentaries and in questions on Aristotle’s natural books. 
“Whether the heaven is composed of matter and form.”​[81]​ (Peter Aureoli and John Major in their Sentence commentaries; and John of Jandun and Johannes de Magistris in their questions on Aristotle’s De caelo.)
“On the number of spheres, whether there are eight or nine, or more or less.”​[82]​ (Thomas Aquinas and John Major in their Sentence commentaries; and Albert of Saxony and Themon Judaeus in their questions on De caelo.)
“Whether in the heavens there are up and down; in front of and behind; [and] right and left.”​[83]​( Bonaventure and Richard of Middleton asked only whether there is a right and left in the heaven; Albert of Saxony and John Buridan asked precisely this question in their questions on De caelo, and Roger Bacon responded to a similar question in his questions on the Physics.)
“Whether the heaven is spherical in shape.”​[84]​ St. Bonaventure and Durandus de Sancto Porciano in their Sentence commentaries; and Albert of Saxony, Johannes de Magistris, Johannes Versor and John Major in their Questions on De caelo and Michael Scot, Themon Judaeus and Pierre d’Ailly in their commentaries and questions on John of Sacrobosco’s Treatise on the Sphere.)
“Whether the heavens are animated.”​[85]​( Richard of Middleton and Peter Aureoli in their Sentences; and John of Jandun and Johannes de Magistris in their Questions on De caelo; Benedictus Hesse in his Questions on the Physics.
“Whether the whole heaven from the convexity of the supreme [or outermost] sphere to the concavity of the lunar orb is continuous or whether the orbs are distinct from each other.”​[86]​ (Bonaventure and Richard of Middleton in their Sentences; and Albert of Saxony and Paul of Venice in their Questions on De caelo.
“Whether celestial motion is natural.”​[87]​ (Durandus de Sancto Porciano in his Sentences; and Johannes de Magistris in his Questions on De caelo.)
“Whether the stars are self-moved or are moved only by the motions of their orbs.”​[88]​ (Bonaventure, Richard of Middleton, and Durandus de Sancto Porciano treated this question in their Sentence Commentaries; Roger Bacon, John of Jandun, John Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Nicole Oresme and a few others considered this question in their Questions on De caelo.)
The questions just cited are cosmological and are limited to a select number of authors. The list could be considerably expanded if questions were included about matter, motion, sense perception, and other themes that were derived from questions on the whole range of Aristotle’s natural books.
Often what appear to be straightforward theological questions about angels, for example, turn out to be almost exclusively about major problems in natural philosophy and include virtually nothing about theology. Gregory of Rimini provides a number of excellent, but fairly typical, examples. I shall only mention one.
In book 2, distinction 2 of his Commentary on the Sentences, Gregory asks “whether angels were created before time [began], or after time [began].”​[89]​ At the beginning of the question, Gregory explains that  “In this question, it is first necessary to see whether time is something created; and if so, what it is. Then we will see about what has been sought.”​[90]​ In a question that extends from page 235 to 277, some 42 pages, Gregory does not again mention angels until page 275, devoting pages 235 to 274, about 39 pages, to a detailed and technical discussion of time in which he draws heavily on the philosophical works of Aristotle and his commentator, Averroes.  In the remaining three pages, Gregory talks about angels and finally concludes, in a number of conclusions, that “no time was created before angels” and, asserts in the fourth conclusion, that  “however time is taken, angels were created before any time was time.” 
 In the very next question (question 2), Gregory asks “whether an angel exists in a divisible or indivisible place.”​[91]​ As in the previous question, Gregory explains his intent: “In this question two things must be seen. The first is whether a magnitude is composed of indivisibles, which is considered in the argument; and [the second is] whether in a magnitude there is something indivisible. To arrive at what is sought, it is necessary to understand each of these [two parts of this first part of the question]. The second thing that must be seen in this question is what is sought [namely, the question itself:  “whether an angel exists in a divisible or indivisible place.]”​[92]​ To expound the two distinct parts of this question, Gregory divides it into two articles. The first article is titled “Three conclusions” and Gregory devotes pages 278 to 331 of the printed edition to a discussion and analysis of these three conclusions, which he describes as follows:
The first is that no magnitude is composed of indivisibles, from which it follows that any magnitude is composed of magnitudes. The second [conclusion is]  that any magnitude is composed of an infinity of magnitudes. The third [conclusion is] that in no magnitude is there something indivisible that is intrinsic to it.​[93]​
The second article is titled “On the existence of an angel in a place.”​[94]​  It extends over the rest of question 2, ranging from page 331 to 339. 
The first lengthy article has nothing to do with angels. Indeed the word “angel” (angelus) occurs only once, on the very last page (p. 331) of the first article.  For this article, which is more than six times longer than the second article, is not about angels, but is wholly about mathematics, physics, and logic as these are applied to the three conclusions. It is about the mathematics and physics of indivisibles, about instants, and about the mathematical continuum. In Gregory’s 53-page discourse on the mathematical themes announced in the three conclusions, he cites Euclid’s Elements a number of times and includes twelve elaborate geometrical diagrams. All of this is carried on within the usual scholastic format, where Gregory raises numerous doubts against his own conclusions and then answers all the doubts. He also disputes the conclusions of numerous thirteenth and fourteenth century scholastic authors.
Let us examine the structure of the first article more closely. At the outset, Gregory says that he will demonstrate the first conclusion of the first article “by mathematical and physical arguments.”​[95]​ He presents the mathematical arguments first (on pages 279-285), offering nine specific arguments in which he employs eight geometrical diagrams. At the end of this section, Gregory proclaims that “many other mathematical arguments could be made, but these suffice.”​[96]​ Immediately following, he declares that “Next, I prove the same conclusion by physical arguments” and proceeds to cite Aristotle’s discussion on indivisible magnitudes in the sixth book of his Physics.  In demonstrating the second and third conclusions of the first article, Gregory follows the same pattern, using a combination of mathematical and physical arguments, the former presented first, then the latter. Again, in the second conclusion, he introduces three mathematical diagrams (pages 300-301).
THE KINDS OF MATHEMATICS AND PHYSICS THAT THEOLOGIANS INTRODUCED INTO THEIR SENTENCE COMMENTARIES:
John Murdoch has shown that theologians imported a number of what he calls “measure” languages into their Sentence commentaries. These measure languages were derived from logic, mathematics, and natural philosophy. [DESCRIBE EACH LANGUAGE]The languages included 
(1) Intension and remission of forms:  here scholastics analyzed how qualities varied in intensity.  For example: can charity be increased? Can the hue of a color be intensified and diminished (or remitted, as they would say); they also applied this technique to velocities, asking whether a velocity can be increased or decreased and then comparing speeds moving under different conditions (Mean speed theorem). 
(2) Euclidean proportionality theory: Here again, they used it to compare motions as well as comparing the forces and resistances that produced those motions. 
(3) The first and last instant of a process (de primo et ultimo instanti): is there a first and last instant of a process of change. Scholastics usually denied that there could be a first and last instant of change, but there could be a first and last instant that was extrinsic to the change. That is, there could be a last instant before the change began and a first instant after the change ended. There could be no first instant of change because of the infinite divisibility of a continuum. You could never arrive at the first instant.
(4) The beginning of a process and the ending of it (de incipit et desinit);  
(5) The setting of boundaries to the range of variable quantities of different types (de maximo et minimo). The limits that concern maxima and minima are not temporal, as they were for problems of first and last instants and for “begins” (incipit) and “ceases” (desinit). With maxima and minima limits concern powers or capacities to do something. “Should a capacity such as Socrates’ ability to lift things be limited by a maximum weight he can lift or by a minimum weight he cannot lift?
(6) A sixth language identified by Murdoch is the language of continuity and infinity.​[97]​ 
Theologians applied these powerful tools to many problems in their Sentence commentaries. Even those who are unfamiliar with these peculiarly medieval techniquesand that includes all but a few scholars can see how unusual, and even extraordinary, it was for such analytical tools to be widely used in theological contexts.
	It was the widespread use of these techniques plus the ubiquitous use of logic with its technical jargon that transformed theological treatises into treatises that were almost treatises in natural philosophy. So extensive were these practices that Edith Sylla could remark that 
“One can point to numerous Sentence Commentaries,”  in which natural science is used extensively, and there are some Sentence Commentaries which in fact seem to be works on logic and natural science in disguisein response to each theological question raised, the author immediately launches into a logical-mathematical-physical disquisition and then returns only briefly at the end to the theological question at hand.​[98]​
We saw that Gregory of Rimini did precisely what Sylla describes. We would have expected that natural philosophers would write about natural philosophy and theologians would write about theology, with relatively little overlap. This neat pattern was never the reality. Why did medieval theologians effectively secularize their theological treatises? Part of the answer, and perhaps even the major part, lies in the way theologians were educated and trained. Virtually all of them had master of arts degrees which signified that they had been thoroughly trained in logic and natural philosophy. When this background is combined with the fact that theologians also believed that theological problems concerning God, revelation, and the faith were capable of reasoned exposition and interpretation, we can see why they were eager to use their analytic skills. In time, however, the urge to use analytical skills seems to have overwhelmed the urge to explicate theological problems. The result was that many theologians in the fourteenth century transformed their theological commentaries into works on natural philosophy and logic. Thus theologians and natural philosophers were all doing natural philosophy. What differentiated theologians from natural philosophers, however, was the right of theologians to apply logic and natural philosophy to theological problems, a right that was not available to natural philosophers who were not also theologians.  In the process of gradually transforming their responses to theological questions into exercises in natural philosophy and logic, medieval theologians also emptied their treatises of spiritual content. Church authorities realized that something like this was happening and tried to stem the tide by issuing edicts to prohibit the excessive reliance of theology on natural philosophy and logic. But their efforts were all in vain. 







[Important: Note that in his question about the earth at rest in the center of the universe, Buridan did not invoke the Bible and potentially reinforcing passages from the Bible. Why? Because he knew that that would be an appeal to revealed sources and was not used in a work on natural philosophy. Oresme also could have appealed to Scripture in his question. He could have said that Genesis speaks of the creation of only one world, etc. But he did not. Like Buridan he considers only Aristotle’s arguments, or arguments reported by Aristotle and others, but which are responses that belong to natural philosophy.]]
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^29	   Buridan, Questions on De caelo, bk.1, qu. 20, principal argument 5, 92,95.
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^44	  Commentary on the Physics, bk. 4, tract. 4, ch. 5, 299, lines 16-18.
^45	   Commentary on the Physics,bk. 3, tract. 2 (De infinito), 168-200.
^46	  Commentary on the Physics,  bk. 3, tract. 2, ch. 2, 172, lines 58-62.
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^59	  General Scholium, 547 (Cajori translation).
^60	   Richard S. Westfall, Never at Rest, 748.
^61	  George M. Marsden, Religion and American Culture (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1990), 102
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^68	   “Quarto quaeritur utrum Deus possit simul contradictoria facere.” Richard of Middleton, Super quatuor libros Sententiarum, vol. 1, bk. 1, distinction 42, qu. 4,  374, col. 1-375, col. 2. My translations below are taken from these pages.
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^70	   Richard of Middleton, Sentences, bk. 1, distinction 44, art. 1, qu. 3, vol. 1, 391, col. 1.
^71	   Robert Holkot, Sentences, bk. 2, qu. 2, Q ii.
^72	   Richard of Middleton, Sentences, bk. 1, distinction 42, qu. 2, vol. 1, 372, col. 2.
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